

**From:** ken.klippenstein@theintercept.com  
**Subject:** Fw: Re: Fw: Re: Fw: Re: Ken and Dan's Security Council article ready for legal  
**Date:** April 17, 2024 at 5:25 PM  
**To:** kenneth.klippenstein@gmail.com



----- Forwarded message -----

From: <william.arkin@theintercept.com>  
Date: On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:24 PM  
Subject: Fw: Re: Fw: Re: Fw: Re: Ken and Dan's Security Council article ready for legal  
To: david.bralow <david.bralow@theintercept.com>  
Cc: Shawn Musgrave <shawn.musgrave@theintercept.com>

I'm sorry David but this sounds like a joke to me. If the Intercept, in its wisdom, thinks Nikita is helpful, that's great. I have been dealing with top secret documents since the early Reagan administration and have never seen or experienced such drama and comedy in my time.

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 2:09 PM, David Bralow <david.bralow@theintercept.com> wrote:

I think you see from Nikita the standard check list we now go through. As I said, I don't want to be overly formal about these things but we're in a position where we can't have another dust up. I know you understand. I feel comfortable based on what you are telling me on this story.

Let's talk about your ideas on how to work through these issues.

David S. Bralow  
General Counsel  
The Intercept Media, Inc.  
david.bralow@theintercept.com

646-784-3287

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From: Nikita Mazurov <nikita.mazurov@theintercept.com>  
Date: On Wednesday, April 17th, 2024 at 4:31 PM  
Subject: Re: Fw: Re: Ken and Dan's Security Council article ready for legal  
To: David Bralow <david.bralow@theintercept.com>

> > <https://theintercept.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=466548&action=edit>

>

>

> Drafts with source protection concerns (e.g., drafts which include leaked materials) should categorically not be put in the CMS prior to said concerns being resolved (they also shouldn't be in a Google Doc, but instead should be drafted in Word and then shared securely either via Proton or Signal).

>

> > copies of unclassified State Department cables obtained by The Intercept

>

>

> Obtained how, specifically? 'Specifically' meaning:

>

> \* How did TI (or presumably, the source(s)) obtain access to the materials? Were they pulled from a filing cabinet? Accessed a Google Drive folder or other online/intranet portal?

> \* What are all the devices the source used in procuring and transferring the materials? Were they using work devices or personal devices? (This device inventory should include devices such as work scanners or photocopiers, etc.).

> \* Where was the source situated when acquiring access to the materials? In the office? At home?

> \* To the best of the source's knowledge, was any of the access logged or otherwise recorded? Were the materials accessed from an auditable electronic system such as Google Drive or Microsoft SharePoint? Were the materials downloaded from a company intranet? Did the source (or anyone at their behest) have to sign a physical logbook? Is there video surveillance footage of the source accessing any of the physical or digital data?

> \* To the best of the source's knowledge, how many people:

> -Had access to the materials?

> -Did access the materials?

> \* Did the source have a plausible work-related need to access the materials?

> \* Has the source:

> -Told anyone they had access to the materials?

> -Told anyone they accessed the materials?

> -Told anyone that they have contacted TI?

> -Provided the materials to anyone else?

> \*Has the source expressed discontent with work-related policies either in a public internal forum (e.g., Slack) or in private conversations (e.g., with colleagues)?

> \*Has the source ever accessed TI from a work device, or while logged into a work account? Or from their personal laptop, but while logged into their work Google account in Chrome?

>> Asked about the cable and whether its opposition to U.N. recognition of Palestinian statehood contradicts the Biden administration's position in support of a two state solution, the State Department did not respond at the time of publication.

>> Asked about the second cable, the State Department and the Ecuadorian embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.

> We should absolutely not be going for comment to any third-party, let alone the State Department(!), about leaked materials prior to a review of the security concerns that would arise from doing so.

> What, specifically, did we ask about the cables? What information did we give to State? Specifically, was information that would identify the exact cables relayed? Were images or copies of the cables shown to State? Were the titles of the cables? Were any quotes from the cables?

> Guillaume Long, senior fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington DC, and former foreign Minister of Ecuador told The Intercept when shown the cable.

> Same concern/questions as above. We should absolutely not be showing leaked materials to third parties, especially prior to an IRT decision about doing so.

> On Wednesday, April 17th, 2024 at 9:47 AM, David Bralow david.bralow@theintercept.com wrote:

>> Take a look.

>> David S. Bralow  
>> General Counsel  
>> The Intercept Media, Inc.  
>> david.bralow@theintercept.com

>> [REDACTED]

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>> ----- Forwarded Message -----  
>> From: Shawn Musgrave shawn.musgrave@theintercept.com  
>> Date: On Wednesday, April 17th, 2024 at 12:41 PM  
>> Subject: Re: Ken and Dan's Security Council article ready for legal  
>> To: william.arkin@theintercept.com william.arkin@theintercept.com  
>> CC: Kate Miller kate.miller@theintercept.com, david.bralow david.bralow@theintercept.com

>>> Thanks, Bill. I'm looping in David since the story is based on leaked cables.

>>> Per protocol, please briefly describe the sourcing for the two cables and any potential source protection sensitivities.

>>> A few additional questions are attached in comments.

>>> —

>>> Shawn Musgrave  
>>> Senior Counsel/Correspondent  
>>> Mobile/Signal: [REDACTED]  
>>> Twitter: @shawnmusgrave  
>>> The Intercept

>>> On Wednesday, April 17th, 2024 at 12:12 PM, william.arkin@theintercept.com william.arkin@theintercept.com wrote:

>>>> <https://theintercept.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=466548&action=edit>

